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Learning the Right Lessons from the
Financial Crisis
Kevin Dowd and Martin Hutchinson
More than eight years after the onset of the global financial cri-
sis, there is one thing that ought to be clear to everyone: uncon-
ventional monetary policies are not working. We have had three
rounds of quantitative easing (QE) and the Fed’s balance sheet
has increased nearly fivefold from $825 million in August 2007 to
just over $4 trillion today; the federal funds rate fell from
5.25 percent to almost zero by December 2008 and has remained
there until the 25 basis point increase in December 2015; federal
debt has more than doubled to just over $18 trillion, rising from
61 percent to 101 percent of GDP; vast amounts of public money
have been thrown at the banks to keep them afloat; and there has
been a huge expansion in financial regulation. To say that the
results have been disappointing would be an understatement: out-
put has been sluggish, unemployment has been persistent, bank
lending has flatlined, productivity has risen at an unprecedentedly
slow rate since 2011, and poverty and inequality have
greatly increased.1 For their part, the banks are still much weaker
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1Going further, these policies have even managed to defy the Zarnowitz rule—
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than they should be, and major banking problems—especially,
“too big to fail”—are still unresolved and continue to pose major
threats to future financial stability. Seven years of extreme
Keynesian policies have failed to produce their intended results.
We see similar results in Europe and in Japan. In the latter, this
comes after 25 years of such policies.
It is curious that in every discipline except Keynesian macro-
economics, practitioners first consider what caused a problem
and then seek a treatment that addressed the cause. If the cause
of a medical condition is excess, then the remedy would be mod-
eration or abstinence. However, in Keynesian economics, if the
cause is excess spending, then the standard treatment is even
more spending. Keynesians then wonder why their treatments
don’t work. To give one example, former U.S. Treasury secre-
tary Larry Summers (2014: 67) recently observed: “It is fair to
say that critiques of [recent] macroeconomic policy . . . , almost
without exception, suggest that prudential policy was insuffi-
ciently prudent, that fiscal policy was excessively expansive, and
that monetary policy was excessively loose.” Summers is correct,
but he fails to note the irony: that the majority of policymakers
still advocate insufficiently prudent prudential policy, exces-
sively expansionary fiscal policy, and excessively loose monetary
policy. One can only wonder what these policymakers expect to
achieve, other than the same result those policies produced last
time, on a grander scale.
It is therefore important that we return to first principles and
rethink monetary and banking policy. Instead of mindlessly
throwing more money and stimulus around, we should consider
what caused our current problems and then address those root
causes. We would suggest that the causes of our malaise are
activist monetary policies on the one hand, and a plethora of
government-created incentives for bank risk taking on the other.
Both causes are themselves the product of earlier state
interventions.
that sharp recessions are followed by sharp recoveries (Zarnowitz 1992). This sug-
gests that these policies have been not so much ineffective as counterproductive,
and that the economy would have recovered faster had the policy response been
less aggressive.
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This diagnosis suggests the following reform program: (1) recom-
moditize the dollar, (2) recapitalize banks, (3) restore strong gover-
nance in banking, and (4) roll back government interventions in
banking. The first two reforms directly address the causes just
mentioned—monetary meddling and government-subsidized risk
taking—and are intended to get the financial system functioning nor-
mally again. The two remaining reforms serve to eradicate the root
causes and strengthen the system long term by protecting it against
future state intervention.
Recommoditizing the Dollar
The key to monetary reform at the most fundamental level is to
establish a robust monetary constitution that would have no place for
institutions with the power to undermine the currency; thus, there
would be no central bank. However, before we can end the Fed, we
must first put the U.S. dollar on a firm footing. The natural way to do
that is to recommoditize it—that is, anchor the value of the dollar to
a commodity or commodity bundle.
The obvious reform is to restore the gold standard. In its purest
form, a gold standard involves a legal definition of the currency unit
as a specified amount of gold. For example, the Gold Standard Act of
1900 defined the dollar as “twenty-five and eight-tenths grains of
gold nine-tenths fine.” This definition implies a fixed equilibrium
gold price of just over $20.67 per troy ounce.
The gold standard has much to commend it: it imposes a discipline
against the overissue of currency, restrains monetary meddlers, and
has a fairly good track record. The main problem, however, is that it
makes the price level hostage to the gold market. If the demand for
gold rises, then the only way in which the gold market can equilibrate
is through a rise in the relative price of gold—that is, a rise in the
price of gold against goods and services generally—and this requires
a fall in the price level (i.e., deflation). Conversely, if the demand for
gold falls or the supply rises, the price level must rise (i.e., inflation
must occur) to equilibrate the gold market. The stability of the price
level under the gold standard, therefore, depends on the stability of
the factors that drive demand and supply in the gold market.
Historical evidence suggests that the price level under the gold stan-
dard was fairly volatile in the short term but much more stable over
the longer term.
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Wemight then ask whether we can improve on the gold standard.
Over the years there have been many proposals to do so. Perhaps the
most promising—and one of the least known—is the “fixed value of
bullion” standard proposed by Aneurin Williams in 1892:
In a country having a circulation . . . made up of paper, and
where the government was always prepared to buy or sell bul-
lion for notes at a price, the standard of value might be kept
constant by varying from time to time this price, since this
would be in effect to vary the number of grains of gold in the
standard unit of money. . . . If gold appreciated [relative to
the price level], the number of grains given or taken for a unit
of paper money would be reduced: the mint-price of gold
bullion raised. If gold depreciated, the number of grains
given or taken for the note would be increased: the mint-
price of gold bullion lowered [Williams 1892: 280].
Thus, the proposal, which admittedly lacks operational details, is
that the system respond to shocks in the relative price of gold by
changing the gold content of the dollar, instead of letting the whole
adjustment fall on the price level, as would occur under a true gold
standard. The gold content of the dollar becomes a shock absorber.
We would emphasize, too, that the Williams system is only one
example from a broader family of similar systems.2 We can imagine
even better systems that would deliver greater price-level stability.
Having thus restored the convertibility of currency, the next step is
to liberalize its issue by removing any Federal Reserve privileges. Any
bank would be allowed to issue its own currency, including banknotes.
Themain restriction would be one designed to guard against counter-
feit: any notes should be clearly distinguishable from those issued by
other banks. Commercial banks would be free to issue notes denom-
inated in U.S. dollars if they wished but those notes would only be
receipts against U.S. dollars as legally defined. In other words, a com-
mercial bank one-dollar note might state, “I promise to pay the bearer
the sum of one dollar,” as per the conditions governing the redeema-
bility of the dollar note, and respecting the legal definition of the U.S.
dollar as a given amount of gold at any particular time. There would
be no restrictions against the issue of currency denominated in other
2See, for example, Irving Fisher’s “compensated dollar” plan (Fisher 1913).
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units of account, nor any restrictions on private currencies. The law
would also be changed to allow U.S. courts to enforce contracts made
in any currencies freely chosen by those involved.
By this point, the door would be open to private banknotes that
would start to circulate at par with Federal Reserve notes. Over time,
their market share would rise, as note-issuing banks would be incen-
tivized to promote their own notes over those of rivals, and the Fed’s
share of the currency market would gradually diminish.
Recapitalize the Banks
Turning now to banking, the first point to appreciate is that the
banks are still massively undercapitalized. The root causes of this
undercapitalization are the incentives toward excessive risk taking
created by various government interventions, including the limited
liability statutes, government deposit insurance, the central bank
lender of last resort function, and the general expectation that banks
can count on being bailed out if they get themselves into trouble.
With the exception of limited liability, these interventions are specif-
ically designed to protect the banking system. In fact, however, they
are seriously counterproductive: by protecting the banks against the
downside consequences of their own decisions, these interventions
subsidize risk taking, and the downside is passed on to the taxpayer.
Naturally, banks respond to this regime by maximizing the value of
the risk-taking subsidy: they increase their leverage and become far
too big, with the biggest ones becoming too big to fail.
This trend toward weaker banks can be seen in the history of bank
capital ratios. In the late 19th century, it was common for banks to
have capital ratios of 40 to 50 percent. By the beginning of the recent
financial crisis, however, the capital-to-asset ratios of the 10 biggest
banks in the United States had fallen to less than 3 percent. The
banks were thus chronically weakened, and the authorities—the
Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporate (FDIC),
and even the federal government—became hostage to them. The
authorities dared not let weak banks fail for fear of the consequences.
It is essential, therefore, that this dependence be ended, with viable
banks made to stand on their own feet, and weak ones eliminated.
Accordingly, the most pressing task is to recapitalize the banking
system: the required minimum capital standards need to be much
higher and much less gameable than they currently are. To this end,
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we suggest that the United States impose a minimum bank capital
ratio of 20 percent, with a further 10 percentage points on top
(i.e., a 30 percent minimum) for systemically important financial
institutions (SIFIs). We suggest that the numerator and the denom-
inator of the capital ratio be defined as conservatively as possible:
• The numerator should be Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1),
defined as tangible common equity plus retained earnings.
CET1 capital gives us a conservative measure of the buffer
available to absorb losses in a crisis. Broader definitions of cap-
ital are not appropriate because they include items such as
deferred tax assets, goodwill, and other intangible assets that
cannot be deployed in a crisis.
• The denominator should be the bank’s total exposure or total
amount at risk. This consists of total assets plus the additional
exposures buried in off-balance-sheet positions—including
securitizations, guarantees, and other commitments. It is
important that these be estimated prudently, with no
allowances made for hedging or correlation offsets, as these can
be unreliable. The objective is to estimate the total amount that
can be lost under worst-case assumptions.
Note that this capital ratio makes no use of risk weights or even risk
models, both of which are essentially useless (Dowd 2014). It is pre-
cisely these features that undermine theBasel bank capital regulations,
which, despite their stated intent to the contrary, have long since
become means by which bankers decapitalize their own banks and
pass much of the cost of their risk taking onto the taxpayer. One might
add that the Basel system is insanely wedded to risk weights and risk
models, because it is captured by the banking industry, which uses it
to game the system. There is therefore no point in the United States
arguing the issue as a topic for futureBasel reform. Instead, theUnited
States should simply withdraw from the Basel system and impose the
above rules unilaterally on banks operating within its own territory.
A high capital requirement would have a number of beneficial
effects:
• First, by forcing banks to bear the downside consequences of
their actions, it would greatly reduce moral hazard, significantly
curb risk taking, and thereby make the financial system much
stronger. We can also think of higher capital requirements as
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greatly reducing the value of the government-created risk-
taking subsidy.
• Second, shareholders would be more exposed to downside
risks, which would strengthen the incentive of bank sharehold-
ers to ensure that senior management—who ultimately account
to them—behave more responsibly. This, in turn, would help
strengthen the governance structures of banks.
• Third, since the new capital regime would dispense with the
arbitrary risk weights that permeate the Basel system, it would
help correct the distorted lending incentives that Basel has cre-
ated. Most notably, Basel attaches a zero risk weight to
sovereign debt, a 50 percent risk weight to mortgage debt, and
a 100 percent risk weight to corporate debt. Those risk weights
artificially encourage banks to buy government, and to a lesser
extent mortgage, debt in preference to corporate debt.
Abandoning risk weights would remove those distortions and
lead to more balanced bank portfolios with a greater emphasis
on corporate lending. The distortions created by the very low
risk weights attached to securitizations and model-based risk
estimates would also be removed.
• Fourth, the use of the total exposure measure in the denomina-
tor of the capital ratio would mean that different positions
would attract different capital requirements in proportion to
the amounts at risk. This would serve to penalize risky positions
and help drive out much of the toxicity that still exists in banks’
on- and off-balance-sheet positions.
For its part, the supplementary SIFI capital requirement would
provide additional insurance against the possibility of a big bank
failure, as well as reducing the damage when such an event does
occur. Big banks would have an incentive to slim down or break
themselves up in order to avoid the higher SIFI capital requirement;
smaller banks would be discouraged from becoming megabanks
themselves. The bankers concerned might object that this additional
requirement would help to make their banks uncompetitive. They
would be right: the underlying objective here is precisely to make the
antisocial, too-big-to-fail business model unsustainable. We want to
squeeze the megabanks so that they shrink, get rid of their toxic posi-
tions, simplify themselves, and become manageable again. That way,
they cease to be threats to the financial system and taxpayers.
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We would also emphasize that high capital requirements should
be imposed as soon as possible. As Admati and Hellwig (2013a: 169)
point out:
It is actually best for the financial system and for the economy
if problems in banking are addressed speedily and forcefully.
If bank equity is low, it is important to rebuild that equity
quickly. It is also important to recognize hidden insolven-
cies and to close zombie banks. If handled properly, the
quick strengthening of banks is possible and beneficial, and
the unintended consequences are much less costly than the
unintended consequences of delay. This is true even if the
economy is hurting.
The need for speed arises in part because zombie banks would
have both the opportunity and the incentive to waste evenmore pub-
lic money, but also because their ongoing weakness would continue
to hamper economic recovery.3
A natural question is why have a 20–30 percent minimum capital
requirement? There are no magic numbers, but we want a minimum
capital requirement that is high enough to remove the overwhelming
part of the moral hazard that currently infects the banking system.
We also want a requirement that is much higher than what we have
at present. As John Cochrane (2013) put it: the capital requirement
should be high enough that banks will never be bailed out again.
In this context, many experts have recommended minimum
capital-to-total asset ratios that are much greater than those called for
under current Basel rules. In an important letter to the Financial
Times in 2010, no less than 20 experts recommended a minimum
ratio of equity-to-total assets of at least 15 percent (Admati et al.
2010), and some of these wanted minimum requirements that are
much higher. In addition, John Allison (2014) and Allan Meltzer
(2012) have called for minimum capital-to-asset ratios of at least
15 percent; Admati and Hellwig recommended a minimum “at least
of the order of 20–30 percent”; Eugene Fama and Simon Johnson
recommended a minimum of 40–50 percent (see Admati and
3The damage caused by excessive regulatory forbearance has been a recurring
theme in U.S. history (see, e.g., Salsman 1990) and is also a key factor in Japan’s
poor economic performance since the Japanese asset bubble burst in 1990.
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Hellwig 2013a: 179, 308, 311); and Cochrane (2013) and Thomas
Mayer4 have advocated 100 percent.
The minimum capital requirement would be enforced by a simple
rule: banks would not be permitted to make any distributions of div-
idends, or to pay any bonuses, until they met the above capital
requirements.5
All banks with capital ratios below the minimum would then be
pressured to produce credible capital plans so that they could resume
distributions. They would have three ways to rebuild their capital:
increase retained earnings, shrink assets, and/or issue more equity.
The first two options, which banks would be forced to do anyway,
would be slow, and given the pressure to resume distributions as
soon as possible, it is difficult to see how most banks could avoid the
need for a share issue to speed up the recapitalization process. The
stock market would value a bank’s shares in line with its perception
of each bank’s future profitability. A bank that is perceived to have
good prospects would obtain good prices for its shares and should be
able to recapitalize easily and quickly. On the other hand, a bank that
is perceived to have poor prospects would experience difficulty sell-
ing its shares. At best, they would trade for low prices and recapital-
ization would be a slow process dependent on the accumulation of
retained earnings and asset sales. At worst, the market might per-
ceive the bank to be insolvent, in which case it would not be able to
raise any new capital at all. The stock market reaction to a bank’s
share offering would provide a very useful signal of the bank’s finan-
cial health.
Strong banks would be revealed to be strong and could
recapitalize quickly; weak banks would be revealed to be weak, and
the weakest would head toward extinction via takeover or failure. In
the interim period, there would be a mass sale of banking assets and
superfluous operations, which would depress the market for those
4Personal discussion.
5In the period since the onset of the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve has
caved to bank pressure in allowing the banks to make dividend payments and
stock repurchases, which undermine the Fed’s own attempts to recapitalize the
banking system. The amounts involved have been very substantial. For example,
from the third quarter of 2007 through the height of the crisis, the largest 19 U.S.
banks paid shareholders almost $80 billion; in fact, about half the money the gov-
ernment invested in the banks during the crisis went straight out the back door to
shareholders (Admati 2012).
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things and ensure that bank managements repositioned themselves
with themost rigorous regard for what was actually profitable. In par-
ticular, capital- and risk- thirsty investment banking operations would
be closed down or sold to brokerage operations without banking
licenses or deposits from the public.
There then arises the delicate question of what to do if some banks
are revealed to be very weak, even insolvent. This is very likely to
occur: some of the big banks (e.g., Bank of America, Citi, and
Deutsche) have high leverage, major problems, and vast off-balance-
sheet positions. Indeed, we cannot rule out the possibility that impos-
ing higher capital standards would reveal the hitherto hidden
weakness of major banks, thereby triggering a major crisis. However,
we can also well imagine a renewed financial crisis being triggered by
other factors, such as a rise in interest rates.
So what should be done in such circumstances? It would make no
sense to keep weak banks afloat at public expense; nor should the
authorities respond as they did in 2007–08, with a series of panicked
late-night deals of (at best) dubious legality. Instead, the authorities
should be required by law to close distressed banks in an orderly
fashion—possibly after a temporary period of public ownership to
preserve orderly markets—with losses allocated according to existing
seniority structures and viable units sold off to competitors. It should
also be mandatory that senior management prepare living wills6 and
be made personally liable for any losses that might fall on taxpayers,
which would almost certainly bankrupt them if their banks failed.
Criminal investigations should also be opened so that any criminal
behavior can be uncovered and punished. Ultimately, we need to
give bankers the right incentives. By way of contrast, the current sys-
tem imposes vast, random fines upon the banks, in some cases for
minor violations that were not illegal at the time they were
“committed.” This is a scam that punishes the wrong people: bank
managements make it through unscathed, but shareholders don’t get
the returns they have earned.
6The downside with existing provisions for living wills is that bankers might be
tempted to booby-trap them in order to blackmail the authorities in the heat of a
crisis. To make living wills useful, it is therefore essential that bankers be suitably
incentivized: they should be made strictly (and potentially criminally) liable for
any losses that might arise if something nasty “unexpectedly” crawls out of the
woodwork.
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Naturally, the imposition of higher capital requirements would
cause the bankers to howl like hyenas, as it would greatly diminish their
pay. Indeed, bankers have been very effective in fighting off attempts
to impose serious increases in capital requirements by spreading a
number of self-serving misconceptions—the real purpose of which is
to defend their subsidized risk taking. This suggests that even themod-
est increases mandated under Basel III would be an enormous impo-
sition to be resisted at all costs (Admati and Hellwig 2013a, 2013b).
These misconceptions have seriously distorted public discussion and
done much to block the reforms needed to get the banking system
working properly again. We should consider a few of them.
The first misconception is that the banks are already adequately
capitalized as they have capital ratios higher than Basel requires: the
eight biggest SIFI banks, the ones that really matter, had an average
ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets of almost 13 percent at the end
of 2014. However, these capital ratios are meaningless; their Basel
adequacy only serves to demonstrate the inadequacy of Basel itself.
The ratios that matter are the leverage ratios, which for the same
banks, at the same time, were 7.26 percent using U.S. Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), and just over 5 percent
using International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (FDIC
2015). The latter are more reliable because of stricter rules applied
to netting, but IFRS also has many problems and is far from perfect,
not least because of its vulnerability to gaming. What’s more, no cur-
rent accounting standards even remotely address the issues raised by
enormous off-balance-sheet positions or allow you to determine
whether a bank is really solvent or not. The much-lauded rebuilding
of American banks’ balance sheets is greatly exaggerated.
The second misconception is that higher capital requirements
would increase banks’ costs. However, if this argument were correct,
it would apply to nonbank corporations as well, and we would expect
them to be equally highly leveraged in order to take advantage of the
“cheapness” of debt. Instead, most nonbank corporations have capi-
tal ratios of over 50 percent. Some don’t borrow at all. In reality,
equity actually helps reduce the costs associated with potential dis-
tress and bankruptcy, and the same benefits apply to banks as to
other corporations.
There is, nonetheless, one case where higher capital is costly—
at least to bank shareholders. When the government intervenes to
cover banks’ downside risk, capital becomes expensive to the
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bank’s shareholders: the higher the bank’s capital level, the more of
the risk subsidy they forgo, because higher capital reduces the cost to
third parties of their risk-taking excesses. When bankers complain
that capital is expensive, they consider only the costs to shareholders
and themselves and do not take into account the costs of their risk
taking to the economy.
In fact, the social cost of higher equity is zero. To quote Admati
and Hellwig (2013a: 130):
A bank exposing the public to risks is similar to an oil tanker
going close to the coast or a chemical company exposing the
environment to the risk that toxic fluid might contaminate the
soil and groundwater or an adjacent river. Like oil companies
or chemical companies that take too much risk, banks that are
far too fragile endanger and potentially harm the public.
But unlike the case of safety risks posed by oil or chemical compa-
nies, higher bank safety standards can be achieved at no social cost,
merely by requiring that banks issue more equity. This, in turn, can
be achieved by reshuffling paper claims between banks and their
investors.
Another of the banks’ false, scaremongering arguments is that high
minimum capital requirements would restrict bank lending and hin-
der economic growth. To give just one example: Josef Ackermann,
the then-CEO of Deutsche Bank, claimed in 2009 that higher capital
requirements “would restrict [banks’] ability to provide loans to the
rest of the economy” and that “this reduces growth and has negative
effects for all” (quoted in Admati et al. 2014: 42). The nonsense of
such claims can be seen by noting that they imply that further increas-
ing banks’ leverage must be a good thing, notwithstanding the fact
that excessive leverage was a key contributing factor to the financial
crisis, and that ongoing bank weakness—weakness associated with
too much leverage—is still impeding economic recovery.
One also encounters claims, based on a confusion of capital with
reserves that mixes up the two sides of a bank’s balance sheet, that
higher capital requirements would restrict bank lending. To give two
examples:
Think of [capital] as an expanded rainy day fund. When used
efficiently, a dollar of capital on reserve allows a bank to put
ten dollars to work as expanded economic activity. The new
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Basel rules would demand that banks would maintain more
dollars on reserve for the same amount of business, or more
capital for no new economic work [Abernathy 2012].
Higher capital requirements would require the building up of
a buffer of idle resources that are not otherwise engaged in
the production of goods and services [Greenspan 2011].
These statements come from experts who should know better.
Such statements would be correct if they applied to requirements for
higher cash reserves, but are false as they apply to requirements for
higher equity capital. Capital requirements constrain how banks
obtain their funds but do not constrain how they use them, whereas
reserve requirements constrain how banks use their funds but do not
constrain how they obtain them.
In fact, evidence suggests that high levels of capital actually sup-
port lending. To quote former Bank of England Governor Mervyn
King (2013):
Those who argue that requiring higher levels of capital will nec-
essarily restrict lending are wrong. The reverse is true. It is
insufficient capital that restricts lending. That is why some of
our weaker banks are shrinking their balance sheets. Capital
supports lending and provides resilience. And, without a
resilient banking system, it will be difficult to sustain a recovery.
Then there is the “the time is not right” bugbear, which is merely
an excuse to kick the can down the road:
From the bankers’ perspective, the time is never ripe to
increase equity requirements or to impose any other regula-
tion. As for the regulators, when the industry is doing poorly,
they worry that an increase in equity requirements might
cause a credit crunch and harm the economy [and never
mind that excessive forbearance only makes the problem
worse]. When the industry is doing well, no one sees a need
to do anything [Admati and Hellwig 2013a: 171].
Last but not least, there is the “level playing field” excuse—a claim
that higher capital requirements would disadvantage “our” banking
industry relative to overseas competition. U.S. bankers make this
claim against competition from Europe; British bankers make it
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against competition from the United States and Europe; and
European bankersmake it against competition from theUnited States
and Britain. In other words, everyone makes it against everyone else.
This argument is false because it presumes that higher capital is costly,
and we know that it is not. It is also false because it ignores the point
that higher capital supports a more resilient banking sector. On the
other hand, the “level playing field” excuse is a good one to give
impressionable local politicians who don’t know any better.
Restore Strong Governance in Banking
We need to restore strong governance in banking. The key to
achieving this is to reestablish strong personal liability on the part of the
major decisionmakers with the bank—namely, senior bank manage-
ment, including board members. More precisely, bank directors
should be subject to unlimited strict personal liability for any losses that
lead their banks to become bankrupt. This would effectively mean that
the bankruptcy of the bank would entail the personal bankruptcy of its
senior management. The strict liability provision would strip them of
any excuses: if it happened on their watch, they would be automatically
liable, without any need to prove dereliction of duty on the part of any
particular director. These liability rules would encourage senior
bankers to take a much greater interest in risk management and shut
down high risk operations that could redound on them personally.
There is also the question of whether there should be extended
liability for bank shareholders. In the United States, double liability
for bank shareholders was common until the 1930s and made for
conservative banking and low bank leverage. Extended liability pro-
vided reassurance to clients—both depositors and borrowers—and
greatly reduced the moral hazards associated with the separation of
ownership and control. The net effect was to greatly strengthen cor-
porate governance in banking and ensure a tight grip on risk taking.
It didn’t always work: even under unlimited liability, the unfortunate
Overend and Gurney shareholders of 1866 subscribed £10 toward
their £100 shares—and were then called upon to put up the other
£90 after the bank defaulted.
Going further, the default liability structure for bank shareholders
should be unlimited liability. Recall that American investment banks
were all unlimited liability partnerships a generation ago. The last to
convert into a limited liability company was Goldman Sachs in 1986.
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It is also worth noting that just over a century ago, J. P. Morgan pre-
ferred to use the unlimited liability model despite the fact that he
could have incorporated—precisely because of the reassurance that
unlimited liability gave his clients. With each deal he made, he put all
his personal wealth on the line.
It is also widely recognized that the conversion of the unlimited
liability investment bank partnerships into corporations was a major
factor promoting greater risk taking and leverage. Describing the first
such conversion—that of Salomon Brothers—Michael Lewis writes:
John Gutfreund [Saloman’s CEO] had done violence to the
Wall Street social order—and got himself dubbed the King of
Wall Street—when, in 1981, he’d turned Salomon Brothers
from a private partnership into Wall Street’s first public corpo-
ration. He ignored the outrage of Salomon’s retired part-
ners. . . . He and the other partners not only made a quick
killing; they transferred the ultimate financial risk from them-
selves to their shareholders. . . . But from that moment, theWall
Street firm became a black box. The shareholders who financed
the risk taking had no real understanding of what the risk takers
were doing, and, as the risk taking grew ever more complex,
their understanding diminished [Lewis 2010: 257–58].
These conversions then led to an increased focus on return on
equity, much greater risk taking, and amajor deterioration in the qual-
ity of corporate governance—all of which were highly predictable.
Of course, unlimited liability has its downsides: if a bank goes
bankrupt, it can ruin its shareholders; it also discourages investors at
the margin, who would expose themselves to losses beyond their
investment; and it makes share trading difficult, because other share-
holders would want to verify and approve new shareholders.
However, one could argue that this is all to the good, because unlim-
ited liability creates exactly the right incentives: if we want the
guardians of our money to guard it as carefully as if it were their own,
then unlimited liability is the natural choice. Recall, also, that Adam
Smith ([1776] 1976: 741) was famously critical of the limited liability
company: “The directors of such companies . . . being the managers
of other people’s money than their own, it cannot well be expected
that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance. . . .
Negligence and profusionmust always prevail . . . in themanagement
of such a company.”
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Moreover, limited liability is not a natural market outcome, but
rather the product of government intervention after a vexed
controversy—during which the free-market advocates of the time
raised exactly the points that we are making here (see Campbell and
Griffin 2006: 61–62).
Roll Back Government Interventions in Banking
The costs of financial regulation cannot be reliably quantified, but
one thing is for sure: they are truly enormous. John Allison likes to
point out that if you asked bankers whether they would prefer to
eliminate taxes or eliminate regulation, the answer would be a no-
brainer: regulation. He also notes that about 25 percent of a bank’s
personnel cost relates to regulations alone (Allison 2014: 351).
Crews (2014) estimates the cost of federal regulation to be just
over $1.8 trillion, or 11 percent of GDP. Of that, the cost of economic
and financial regulation makes up the thick end of half a trillion dol-
lars. There can therefore be no doubt that regulation is a huge and
growing drag on the economy. Most of it should simply be swept
away: in the banking area, this would entail the repeal of a whole
range of legislation, including Dodd-Frank, Sarbanes-Oxley, the
Community Reinvestment Act, and Truth in Lending.
We also need to eliminate the various government-sponsored
enterprises (GSEs) set up to interfere with the banking system,
which have each promoted excessive risk taking. The first target
would be Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These entities have
absolutely no useful role to play in the economy, have done enor-
mous damage to the U.S. housing market, and were key contributors
to the global financial crisis. They should be shut down forthwith
before they do any more damage.
The next target would be the FDIC, the very existence of which
serves to encourage excessive risk taking by protecting bankers
against many of the adverse consequences of bank failure. In partic-
ular, the FDIC removes any incentive depositors have to monitor
their banks as they otherwise would; bankers respond by lowering
their lending standards, taking more aggressive risks, and running
down their capital. Reforms here would entail:
• The establishment of a program to phase out deposit insurance:
this might involve a gradual reduction in the amounts
covered—currently $250,000 in standard cases—combined
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with the introduction of and gradual increase in depositor coin-
surance, up to the point where FDIC insurance is eliminated.
• A gradual reduction and eventual phasing out of the FDIC’s
role in examining and supervising banks: such functions would
no longer be necessary once strong governance structures had
been reestablished, and banks had been recapitalized and then
adjusted their business models to root out excessive risk taking.
• Reforms to provide for low-cost means of enforcing consumer
protection: these might involve private arbitration mechanisms
or ombudsmen procedures, as are used inmany other countries.
• Reforms to privatize decisions about when banks should go into
bankruptcy and how such institutions should be resolved: such
issues should be left to the private sector as is standard in other
industries. A major benefit of such reforms is that they would
eliminate the current biases—the incentives toward excessive
forbearance—that exist when such decisions are left with regu-
latory agencies that are subject to capture by political or indus-
try interests.
The third and most difficult reform is to roll back the most trou-
blesome GSE of all—the Federal Reserve. The initial steps would
entail implementation planning for the reforms suggested here
(e.g., to recommoditize the dollar), as well as contingency planning
for plausible adverse events such as a rise in interest rates, the failure
of a SIFI, or a renewed financial crisis.7 We then need a series of pro-
grams to carry out the following important tasks:8
• Roll back and ultimately abolish the Fed’s supervisory and reg-
ulatory roles, and eliminate ancillary programs such as the
Fed’s Comprehensive Capital Assessment Review “stress
tests.”
• Privatize the Fed’s payment system, FedWire.
7This contingency planning should consider the possibility of another financial
emergency and should include a program to keep the banking system as a whole
operating at a basic level to prevent widespread economic collapse, fast-track
bankruptcy processes to resolve problem banks and, where possible, return them
to operation as quickly as possible, a prohibition of cronyist “sweetheart deals” for
individual banks, and provisions to hold senior bankers to account.
8There are other tasks of lesser importance, which nevertheless still need doing.
These include, for example, transferring the Fed’s statistical operations to the
U.S. Bureau of Statistics.
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• End the Fed’s lender of last resort function, and close down its
discount window: last resort and discount window lending
would then be left to the private sector.
• Close down the Fed’s foreign exchange desk and the New York
Fed’s open market operations.
• Close the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, or, failing
that, transfer it to the Commerce Department where Congress
can oversee it.
• Transfer the Fed’s government debt management responsibili-
ties to the Treasury.
• End the Fed’s role as a bankers’ bank by, for example, spinning
off the Fed’s deposit-taking functions to a separate voluntary-
membership bankers’ bank entity whose only function would
be to hold and manage banks’ deposits.
• Wind down and eventually phase out Federal Reserve cur-
rency: the only currency in circulation would then be that
issued by regular commercial banks.
• Clean up and wind down the Fed’s balance sheet: this task is
probably best carried out by spinning off the Fed’s asset port-
folio into a separate runoff company, whose sole purpose would
be to run down its asset portfolio at minimum cost to the tax-
payer. Given the size of the Fed’s balance sheet, this process
would likely take a considerable amount of time and lead to a
prolonged period of depressed asset prices and associated
higher interest rates. It is likely to end up being very costly to
the taxpayer whatever happens.
• Shut down the Federal Reserve Board. Individual Federal
Reserve banks would then be free to continue to operate but
would be stripped of any privileges or public policy responsibil-
ities. It would be up to their member banks to decide upon
their future.
The final regulatory rollback would be to phase out capital ade-
quacy regulation. Such regulation would no longer be necessary once
government-created incentives to excessive risk taking had been
eliminated. The determination of banks’ capital ratios could then be
left to the banks themselves operating under the discipline of the free
market. Banks that ran their capital ratios too low would then be sub-
ject to punishment by the market: they would lose confidence and
market share, and so forth; in extremis, they would eventually be run
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out of business and should be allowed to fail as would be the case
with badly run firms in any free market.
Conclusion
Central bankers have printed trillions in new base money, brought
interest rates to zero (or even below), and thrown trillions at banks in
subsidies with no noticeable positive effects. Yet, central bankers are
considering more monetary stimulus. It appears that they have
learned all the wrong lessons from the crisis. The central lesson they
drew was that if a policy doesn’t have the desired effects, then
they should keep trying it again and again but on ever-greater scales.
The lessons they should have drawn are that “stimulus”—whether in
the form of QE, ZIRP, or NIRP—is counterproductive.
As far as the banking system is concerned, they convinced them-
selves that they had no choice but to bail the banks out; instead, they
failed to realize that what was needed was a major structuring in
which the zombies would have been shut down, the remaining banks
recapitalized (and not at public expense), and the banks’ governance
structures overhauled to make the bankers personally liable for any
losses they make.
The task ahead is to get both groups to unlearn these lessons: cen-
tral bankers need to return to their senses, and commercial bankers
need to be made to understand that the ongoing party of excessive
risk taking at public expense is over; and, in turn, will only happen
when the party really is over.
The four reforms discussed in this article—recommoditizing the
dollar, recapitalizing the banks, restoring strong governance in bank-
ing, and rolling back government interventions in banking—can lead
the way to a more robust financial system and strong economic
growth. To implement a positive reform program, however, will
require leaders who have both an understanding of the lessons
learned from the financial crisis and the courage to act on them.
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